Over the past forty years, the countries of Western Europe have faced multiple challenges to the power of their national governments. With the deepening of European integration, control over fiscal, social, immigration and certain dimensions of foreign policy has been relocated from the national to the supranational level. At the same time, demands for greater regional autonomy have led, in many of these countries, to the adoption of decentralization schemes, with policy competencies over areas such as health, education, and other social programs devolved to subnational levels. The power of national governments is being hollowed out both from above and below.
Despite the joint occurrence of these two processes, the scholarly literature has typically explored the impact of Europeanization and decentralization separately. 1 In terms of political party fortunes, research (Marsh 1998; Kousser 2004) has shown that governing parties are punished in European Parliamentary elections, whereas smaller parties tend to benefit, especially relative to their national support levels. The effects of decentralization have been less well established, but there is evidence that greater regional autonomy is expected to (and often does) hurt governmental parties and strengthen the support of ethnoterritorial actors at the subnational level (Meguid n.d.) . However, there is no research to date on whether, across countries and over time, these processes reinforce each other or whether, by changing the structure of the institutional environment and the geographic focus of the actors and voters, they undermine each other.
The goal of this paper is to shed light on the interaction between decentralization and further European integration and, specifically, their effects on party fortunes. While these processes could influence the support of any set of parties that competes at multiple levels (i.e., 1 Notable exceptions are Lynch (1996) and De Winter and Gomez-Reino (2002) .
subnational and European elections), the ramifications are particularly interesting for the set of ethnoterritorial parties, which has championed the strengthening of the region and, conversely, the weakening of the national-level of government. In the absence of decentralization, these parties often appealed over the heads of their national governments to the European level for both financial support and reinforcement of the legitimacy of their regional identities and concerns. The implementation of decentralization or stronger degrees of regional autonomy in many countries signaled the achievement of some or all of these parties' policy goals, with, for instance, the transfer of political and often fiscal powers to the region and the reinforcement of the primacy of the regional identity and regional level. In light of the spread of decentralization and the deepening of existing regional autonomy structures across parts of Western Europe, the question becomes how central is the European level in the minds of the ethnoterritorial parties and their voters. What effect does decentralization have on the electoral support for these parties in the European Parliamentary elections?
The paper begins by examining the incentives introduced by EU integration and decentralization for ethnoterritorial party mobilization and electoral support. I then derive hypotheses about the expected effect of decentralization on the electoral performance of ethnoterritorial parties in EP elections. Cross-sectional time-series analyses of the effects of decentralization support the claim that ethnoterritorial parties still see the European Union as an arena for expressing regionalist identities and pursuing additional political and financial legitimacy; controlling for the diverse national, European and party-specific incentives for ethnoterritorial party performance in EP elections, this paper finds that the vote share of ethnoterritorial parties increases with decentralization. Thus, rather than creating competing arenas of power and interest, these results suggest that the multiplication of levels of government can be a complementary process, at least for some political parties. European countries were fielding candidates in these supranational elections.
The Advantages of European Integration
For ethnoterritorial parties, the European Union provides political and even financial opportunities. The European Parliament opens up the possibility of ethnoterritorial party political representation and influence over a growing number of policy areas. While many of these regionalist actors already participate in elections in their own countries, the institutional structure of the EP provides advantages for these parties over national political arenas. Second, smaller parties are advantaged by the "second-order" nature of the EP elections.
This term, coined by Reif and Schmitt (1980) , refers to the fact that the European Parliament has fewer competencies, and thus is a less important body, than national legislatures. 7 It follows,
Reif and Schmitt argue, that voters will be less likely to turn out to EP elections than national ones and, more germane for our analysis, that those voters who do turn out will be more likely to vote sincerely than strategically; without having to worry about which parties could form a government, voters in EP elections can cast their ballots for the party closest to their preferences.
This effect disproportionately advantages smaller parties, including ethnoterritorial parties, which often fall victim to voters' concerns about "wasting votes" in national elections.
Alternatively, it has been argued that the low importance level of these elections encourages protest voting and that the minor party boost in EP elections comes from the fact that protest votes are likely to be given to smaller, non-mainstream parties.
The European Union also provides advantages to ethnoterritorial parties outside of elections to the European Parliament. The creation of these regional governments is expected to have a positive effect on ethnoterritorial parties. Decentralization multiplies the number of governmental offices and the number of elected governmental officials with control over significant policy-making and implementing capabilities. While all parties that compete at the regional level have access to these offices, ethnoterritorial parties are particularly well placed to benefit from these reforms.
The process of decentralization reinforces the importance of the region politically and in the minds of the voters. It provides incentives for regionally based demands and identities. This coincides with and, therefore, serves to legitimize and strengthen the ethnoterritorial parties' longtime message that the region is the natural unit of politics and society. 10 Combine this with the fact that most Western European governments adopted decentralization to appease electorally threatening ethnoterritorial parties (Heller 2002; Meguid n.d.) , and we would expect these parties to prosper electorally from the decentralization process at the subnational level.
Although this topic has not been the subject of much research to date, there is evidence of Decentralization changes the need of ethnoterritorial parties for the European level and for representation in the European Parliament. This observation is at the heart of both sets of hypotheses. But the implications of this observation for ethnoterritorial participation and success at the European level and in the EP differ depending on whether the two institutions are seen as 12 Italy and Spain initiated their decentralization processes in 1972 and 1979, respectively, before they contested their first EP elections (in 1979 and 1987, respectively) .
substitutes or complements. For those of the first opinion, ethnoterritorial party commitment to the EU and vote shares in EP elections should decline with higher levels of regional decentralization. This prediction rests on the idea that the European Union was always seen as a second-best environment for ethnoterritorial parties unable to achieve their primary goal of regional autonomy or even regional independence. Participation at the European level was a means for ethnoterritorial parties to pressure national governments for increased regional recognition and autonomy. Funds from the European Regional Development Fund were a substitute for the lack of national-level support for regional improvement. According to De Winter and Gomez-Reino (2002: 491) , the ethnoterritorial parties only had "the most-outspoken pro-EU attitudes" of any party family in the year 1984.
With decentralization increasing the focus on regional politics and boosting regional powers and the availability of regional resources, ethnoterritorial parties have less need for the European level. As a result, we can expect the retreat of these parties and their voters to the regional level. Less effort and attention will be paid to non-regional levels, including the European level, and we can expect the turnout of ethnoterritorial party voters, and consequently the support for these parties, in EP elections to decline. It is important to note that these expectations do not depend on the ethnoterritorial party having secured all of its regional autonomy policy goals. For ethnoterritorial parties ultimately seeking regional independence, decentralization may only be the first step. However, the ethnoterritorial party may gamble that this objective can be best achieved from within the country and the region; these parties will look to the region, and not to the EU, to champion independence or to pass a referendum on secession.
While this is one perspective on the effects of decentralization on ethnoterritorial party mobilization at the European level, it is not the only possibility. 21 The resulting set of ethnoterritorial parties included in the analysis is listed in Table   1 . 19 With the data organized as party panels, the separate inclusion of multiple ethnoterritorial parties contesting the same district might violate the assumed independence of the observations. It could introduce the possibility that the electoral success of one ethnoterritorial party simply reflects the failure of a different ethnoterritorial party in the same district. 20 The Lega Nord poses an exception to this rule. Unlike most regionalist parties, it contests electoral districts outside of its regional "homeland." In the 2004 EP elections, for example, the LN ran lists in all five Italian districts. However, it was not competing with the other ethnoterritorial parties included in this dataset in three of those regions. In light of this fact and the recognition that combining all Italian parties would lead to the loss of 10 observations from the data analysis, LN has been included as a distinct party in the regressions. 21 Even if we were willing to ignore the statistical problems of modeling the vote share of competing regionalist Spanish parties, it would be impossible to include these parties separately. Spanish ethnoterritorial parties often form national party lists with other ethnoterritorial parties from the same and different regions. For instance, in the 2004 EP elections, the ethnoterritorial party lists were GALEUSCA, Europa de los Pueblos and Coalición Europea. As a result, parties do not individually accrue votes, and thus the percentage of voters casting ballots to support a particular party in a given list cannot be determined. 
Explanatory Variables
An assessment of how ethnoterritorial party support changes in response to domestic institutional change requires a measure of that change. The main explanatory variable of interest is, therefore, a measure of the degree of decentralization in a country and region. As seen across the countries and regions of Western Europe, decentralization is not a black-or-white phenomenon. National governments transfer different configurations and degrees of competencies to the subnational level. And these differences not only exist between countries but also within countries and over time. On the basis of these observations, crude indicators of federal versus non-federal systems used in other contexts (e.g., Castles 1999) are not appropriate.
Rather, the variable must provide a more nuanced measure of the degree of powers decentralized to the subnational level (e.g., executive, legislative and/or financial powers) and the structure of those subnational offices (whether the office is directly elected). Moreover, the variable must account for regional differences within a country, by providing data at the regional level. 22 This is particularly important for countries with asymmetrical decentralization, where the powers devolved to one region may be very different from the powers devolved to another. 23 Gerring and Thacker (2008) differentiate themselves from the other decentralization datasets because they fully cover Western Europe and have yearly data. However, their decentralization index (called "unitarism") includes a measure of bicameralism, which is irrelevant to this discussion and muddies its ability to capture decentralization differences. Equally important, their data do not account for and, thus, do not measure regional variation in the degree of decentralization within countries. 24 For a more detailed discussion of the components of the Index and its coding, see Hooghe et al. (2008: 123-42 
Institutional Control Variables
The advantages that ethnoterritorial parties are expected to have in EP elections, and thus the effects of decentralization on their vote shares, turn on the institutional features of those European elections. To account for the differences in ethnoterritorial party vote over time and across countries, it is important to control for these institutional features. These factors can be divided into country-specific, party-specific and period effects. , Duverger 1954; Lijphart 1994; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Cox 1997) suggests that parties do better under more permissive electoral rules, such as proportional representation, and large electoral districts, which enhance the proportional effect. And Kousser's (2004) analysis of EP elections reveals that minor parties in particular gain higher levels of support in EP than in national elections when the EP system is more proportional and has larger constituencies.
There is reason to believe, however, that the relationships between these variables and the vote of ethnoterritorial parties in particular may be different. As noted by Rae (1971) and Sartori (1976) , countries with regionally concentrated parties, such as ethnoterritorial parties, are the exception to Duverger's law; their support levels are expected to be higher under plurality rules than PR rules. This claim is substantiated by Meguid (2008: 74) for ethnoterritorial party support in national elections in Western Europe. 27 Similarly, nationwide districts may hinder regional parties that have difficulties appealing to voters across the country, or even coming up with enough potential MEPs to populate or resources to mount a national list; these issues have repeatedly frustrated the efforts of French ethnoterritorial parties to contest EP elections (see Lynch 1996: 170) . Regional districts present fewer monetary or list-populating problems and serve to reinforce the regional identity of many ethnoterritorial parties.
To test these conflicting hypotheses and control for the varied institutional setting in which the ethnoterritorial parties compete, I include two dummy variables. 28 The first is coded 1 if the electoral system is PR, and 0 if it is plurality. The second variable is coded 1 if a country employs subnational constituencies for the EP elections, and 0 if it has one nationwide district.
These coding are based on data from Bowler and Farrell (1993) and Nugent (2003; .
Building on the minor party-specific logic, we expect a positive relationship between EP vote and the first variable and a negative relationship between EP vote and the second variable. The predictions are the opposite if ethnoterritorial parties benefit from plurality rules and smaller, geographically concentrated constituencies.
Just as the EP elections have institutional characteristics that should affect the electoral support of any ethnoterritorial party, research demonstrates that their institutional features also have party-specific effects. Parties in national government consistently receive lower electoral support in EP elections than non-governing parties (Marsh 1998; Kousser 2004) . 29 While the literature has focused its discussions almost exclusively on the mainstream parties leading the government, its rationale suggests that the same effect should emerge for any party represented in the government or government coalition. Thus, I include a variable indicating whether the 28 An alternative approach suggested by the parties literature for capturing both country-specific electoral institutions is to employ a measure of district magnitude (DM). However, while the district magnitude measure allows the researcher to model differences in the permissiveness of electoral rules, it does not adequately capture differences between the national and subnational structure of EP electoral districts. In particular, the DM measure fails to allow us to distinguish countries with a small number of MEPs elected in one national district from countries with a large number of MEPs elected from across several subnational districts. As argued in the text, the incentives for regionalist party support are expected to be very different in these two circumstances. Because the fortunes of regionalist parties are expected to be sensitive to these differences, I employ the two separate electoral institution variables rather than the combined DM measure. 29 Voters are thought to turn against governing parties because of midterm malaise or retrospective assessments.
ethnoterritorial party was a formal member of the governing coalition during the time of the EP election. 30 This information is taken from Woldendorp et al. (1998) Clues about the effects of these variables emerge from an initial analysis of the data. As shown in the bivariate correlations in Table 2 , the degree of decentralization is positively and significantly correlated with the vote percentage received by an ethnoterritorial party in the European elections. This outcome suggests that ethnoterritorial parties and their voters may be motivated by (1) the strengthening of their regional identification triggered by decentralization and/or (2) the advantages of the EU for decentralized regions, which serve to increase voters' support of the regionalist parties in EP elections. Given that these ethnoterritorial parties are only ruling as part of a coalition government and that the voter's ability to assign policy responsibility and blame is lower in coalition governments than single-party governments (Powell 2000) , it is logical that voters may only hold the larger, more visible governmental parties responsible, downplaying the power or even forgetting about the presence of the smaller, ethnoterritorial coalition partners. Of course, further investigation is necessary into why governmental status would actually boost -rather than just not harm -the ethnoterritorial parties' support.
The bivariate correlations provide some hints about the explanatory power of decentralization. But to fully understand the effects of this institutional reform on the electoral support of ethnoterritorial parties, we need to consider its influence when the other factors shaping the general EP electoral environment are controlled for. To test my hypotheses, I employ pooled cross-sectional time-series analyses. I ran ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with lagged dependent variables and panel-corrected standard errors. I followed the advice of Katz (1995, 1996) and included a lagged dependent variable to eliminate autocorrelation in the underlying data. 31 31 Because the decentralization variable is often time invariant within party panels and has similar values across ethnoterritorial party panels within the same country, we cannot include country fixed effects (Beck and Katz 2001: Table 3 presents the results of my multivariate analyses of ethnoterritorial party vote share, with the predicted signs of the explanatory variables listed in column two. As revealed by both Models I and II, decentralization has a positive and statistically significant effect on the EP vote share of an ethnoterritorial party: as the degree of decentralization in a region increases, voter support for the ethnoterritorial party in that region also increases. These results offer 492). But any concerns about having unmodeled country-specific effects are allayed. The institutional control variables added to the model provide a more theoretically rigorous and substantive way of capturing any countryspecific factors in an ethnoterritorial party's vote than would the set of substantively empty placeholder country dummies. Indeed, as a rule, Beck and Katz (2001: 493) recommend including substantive predictors of countrylevel effects over country dummies. support for the claim that the European Union remains important for ethnoterritorial parties even as they achieve (some of) their regional goals.
This positive effect of decentralization translates into a significant boost in an ethnoterritorial party's vote share. Based on the results from the more complete Model II, a change in the RAI measure from one standard deviation below the mean (RAI=5) to one standard deviation above it (RAI=18) results in an increase in ethnoterritorial party vote of 2.18 percentage points. 32 With the mean vote share of the ethnoterritorial party panels in my dataset at 4.05%, this jump caused by decentralization is equivalent to an over 50% increase in party vote. Clearly, this domestic institutional reform has significant supranational effects.
The results from Model II also highlight the importance of the institutional environment in which EP electoral competition takes place. As foreshadowed by the bivariate correlations, the Maastricht Treaty variable has the expected positive effect on ethnoterritorial party vote.
Consistent with the idea that these regional parties view the European Union as a source of political and financial resources -both before and especially after decentralization -their support is estimated to increase by 0.67 percentage points when the EP has more powers and when the importance of regions is explicitly recognized within the European decision-making process. There is no evidence therefore that voters shy away from supporting ethnoterritorial parties as the importance of the EP, and the possibility of wasting a vote, increases.
A country's electoral rules also has a significant effect on regionalist party EP vote shares. Table 3 shows that ethnoterritorial party vote is weaker in EP elections held under proportional representation than under plurality rules. While this finding runs counter to general theories on minor party performance, it reinforces the recent work on ethnoterritorial parties. As shown by De Winter (1998: 219) and Meguid (2008) for national-level elections, these regionalist parties benefit from electoral systems that reward geographic concentration.
There is no support for the hypotheses that ethnoterritorial EP vote share is significantly different in countries with subnational than nationwide districts. Similarly, although the sign is positive as was seen in the bivariate correlations, being a member of a national government has no statistically significant effect on the EP vote share of an ethnoterritorial party.
Discussion
The twin processes of European integration and decentralization have come to shape the political and electoral opportunities for political parties across Western Europe over the past forty years. And yet, no research to date has systematically explored the interaction of these two This paper represents a first step in the exploration of the effect of decentralization on political party performance. For the ethnoterritorial parties that contest EP elections, decentralization has had a positive effect, at least electorally. The regionalist logic behind this vote boost is not conceptually limited to ethnoterritorial parties, however. Indeed, although ethnoterritorial parties are the most obvious and often were the earliest versions of regional parties, they are not the only ones. Regionalist parties of various political stripes have emerged in many EU member-states. And this paper's claims about the effects of decentralization on EP vote should, for the most part, apply to these cases. Although non-ethnic regionalist parties may be less motivated by the EU's legitimization of independentist movements, regionalist party voters should be equally likely to take advantage of the increased EU attention to the regions and the opportunity to express an already enhanced regionalist party allegiance at the European level.
Whether decentralization's reach extends beyond ethnoterritorial to other regionalist parties is, thus, a promising subject that awaits future research.
